Executive Summary

• The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the occupied Palestinian territory (OCHA-oPt) leads and coordinates the UN’s humanitarian response in Gaza and the West Bank, administering large-scale funding and operational frameworks through the OCHA oPt Humanitarian Fund, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), and the cluster system.
• OCHA-oPt maintains operational, financial, and institutional relationships with Hamas-controlled bodies in Gaza and with NGOs linked to designated terrorist organizations, including entities tied to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
• OCHA-oPt coordinates extensively with the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Social Development (MoSD), including reliance on ministry beneficiary lists, registries, and data used in humanitarian programming and cash-assistance frameworks.
• Declassified Hamas documents from 2018–2022 indicate direct Hamas involvement in OCHA-linked humanitarian activities, including review of surveys, modification of data collection tools, approval requirements for field operations, and oversight through security and intelligence channels.
• Organizations linked to terror groups are integrated not only into OCHA funding pipelines, but also into advisory, coordination, and governance structures connected to humanitarian operations in Gaza and the West Bank.
• Significant transparency deficiencies within OCHA reporting and funding mechanisms limit independent oversight of humanitarian aid flows, implementing partners, and project implementation following the large-scale expansion of aid after the October 7th attacks.

Introduction

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the occupied Palestinian territory (OCHA-oPt) plays a central role in coordinating humanitarian operations, directing aid frameworks, managing humanitarian funding mechanisms, and shaping international assessments regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Through the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), “clusters,” and the OCHA oPt Humanitarian Fund (OPT HF), OCHA exercises significant influence over the allocation of humanitarian resources and the selection of local implementing partners in Gaza and the West Bank.

As humanitarian assistance to Gaza expanded significantly following the October 7, 2023 Hamas massacre and subsequent war, concerns regarding OCHA-oPt’s integrity, neutrality, transparency, and oversight methods have become increasingly acute. In particular, substantial evidence indicates that OCHA-oPt cooperates extensively with Hamas-controlled governmental bodies in Gaza and maintains operational, financial, and institutional relationships with organizations tied to designated terrorist groups.

This report examines OCHA-oPt’s operational and institutional framework in Gaza and the West Bank, focusing on its coordination and funding mechanisms and the implications for humanitarian neutrality and oversight. The analysis draws on publicly available OCHA and NGO documentation, as well as Arabic-language Hamas documents seized in Gaza and subsequently declassified by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). 

The findings demonstrate that Hamas-controlled ministries and organizations linked to designated terrorist groups are not incidental participants within OCHA frameworks. Rather, these actors are integrated into aid coordination, beneficiary-selection, advisory structures, cluster frameworks, and funding pipelines.

The examples detailed in this report suggest systemic failures within OCHA-oPt’s partner-vetting, oversight, and governance frameworks, with significant implications for donor governments, UN agencies, and humanitarian operations in Gaza and the West Bank.

Cooperation Between OCHA-oPt and the Hamas-Controlled Ministry of Social Development (MoSD)

OCHA-oPt cooperates extensively with the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) in Gaza, including in the coordination and distribution of humanitarian assistance and cash-transfer programming. 

The MoSD, operating under the effective control of Hamas, coordinates a broad range of aid programs in Gaza, including cash assistance schemes. In these roles, the Ministry identifies beneficiaries for humanitarian projects, enabling Hamas to influence the allocation of cash and other forms of assistance. 

Since at least 2019, the Gaza branch of the MoSD has been headed by senior Hamas official Ghazi Hamad, raising significant concerns regarding the diversion, politicization, and manipulation of humanitarian aid. In November 2024, the US Department of the Treasury designated Hamad as a “senior Hamas official,” citing his role within Hamas governance and his previous responsibility over Gaza border crossings used for the transfer of materials later diverted to Hamas military infrastructure. (See Appendix 1 for additional information on Hamad.)

OCHA-oPt Coordination with MoSD Leadership

On November 29, 2021, the MoSD published photographs and details of a meeting between Ghazi Hamad and an OCHA delegation led by the OCHA Director in Gaza. According to the Ministry, the meeting focused on “ways of mutual cooperation.” Hamad emphasized the “ongoing relationship with OCHA regarding many significant interventions on multiple issues related to services and assistance,” while both parties reportedly agreed to expand joint programming aimed at addressing humanitarian needs in Gaza.

Ghazi Hamad (3rd from right) meeting with officials from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in November 2021.

Coordination with MoSD Reflected in OCHA Documents

OCHA’s funding requirements for humanitarian assistance are defined annually through the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), which is based on the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO).

The HNO 2021 states that estimates regarding individuals in need under the shelter cluster were “calculated using datasets and other information provided by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MoPWH), the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD), assessments conducted by Cluster partners, and the Shelter Cluster database.” The report further notes that information concerning families in Gaza residing in rented accommodation and assessed as being at high risk of eviction was derived from a “MoSD database regularly tracking this indicator.”

Cash Assistance Programs

OCHA’s operational coordination with the MoSD is also reflected in formal humanitarian planning and cash-assistance frameworks. 

According to a January 2024 Terms of Reference document, OCHA partners with the MoSD in Gaza “to meet rapidly increasing humanitarian needs,” with humanitarian actors providing cash assistance to approximately 154,307 families (around 1.1 million individuals), including a significant number drawn directly from the MoSD social registry. The Gaza Cash Working Group (CWG), co-led by OCHA and Action Against Hunger, coordinates this response. Within this framework, beneficiary selection relies on multiple overlapping lists, including MoSD registries and newly registered households. According to the Terms of Reference, the CWG “leads the crosscheck of all lists to ensure deduplication between humanitarian cash actors. Most cash actors report back bilaterally to the MoSD on who has been covered…The aim is for all CWG members to rapidly feedback to the MoSD social registry on which households have been covered and with what amount.”

This coordination continued following the large-scale expansion of humanitarian assistance after October 7, 2023. In August 2025, representatives of the MoSD and the CWG held a meeting to “discuss ongoing efforts and interventions in the field of social protection and cash assistance, amid the worsening humanitarian situation in Palestine, especially in the Gaza Strip.”

MOSD’s central role is reflected in various Gaza-based cash assistance projects: 

• In 2023, the French international organization Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED) received $317,217 from the OCHA oPt Humanitarian Fund for a project supporting vulnerable households in Gaza. Project documentation states that ACTED coordinated with the MoSD to obtain “a list of the 500 most vulnerable HHs [households]” in order to select 400 eligible households for multipurpose cash assistance. The project was additionally informed by assessments conducted by ACTED, the 2022 Multi-Sectorial Needs Assessment (MSNA), and “recommendations from the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) and the Cash Working Group (CWG) in Gaza.”
• In 2022, ACTED received $499,866 for a food security project implemented in collaboration with the MoSD. Project documentation states that “820 beneficiaries…will be selected through coordination with the MoSD,” and that ACTED would provide cash assistance in installments to households selected “under coordination with MoSD.”
• Save the Children received $542,568 from the OCHA oPt Humanitarian Fund in 2022 for multipurpose cash assistance to vulnerable households in Gaza. According to project documentation, beneficiaries were selected “in coordination with MoSD” and “MoSD will provide the list of beneficiaries.” Save the Children coordinated “with MoSD to obtain the preliminary list nominated [sic] beneficiaries, selection, registration, and baseline.”

Other Programs Reflecting OCHA-MoSD Cooperation

OCHA’s cooperation with the MoSD extends beyond cash programming. In 2020, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) reported that it was developing tools and guidance for urban displacement response “in close cooperation with MoSD and OCHA,” with activities “implemented under the umbrella of the OCHA-led IDP [Internally Displaced Persons] Working Group and in support of MoSD.”

The MoSD is also formally embedded within OCHA coordination structures. A 2021 Shelter Cluster document lists the Ministry as a member of the Strategic Advisory Group in Gaza, alongside United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Ma’an Development Center, and NRC. The Strategic Advisory Group is described as “a decision-making body of the cluster led by the cluster coordinator chosen by consensus,” highlighting MoSD’s role in shaping humanitarian priorities and operational decisions.

The Site Management Working Group (SMWG), operating within the OCHA cluster system, depends upon operational coordination with the MoSD. In January 2025, five SMWG partners established a presence in Gaza City to “support site management operations” and coordinate the establishment of new site locations with local authorities, “particularly the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD).” This indicates MoSD involvement not only in the use of administrative datasets for planning purposes, but also in the coordination of displacement site management within OCHA-led humanitarian frameworks.

Coordination with Hamas-Linked Ministries Reflected in Hamas Documents

The operational relationship between OCHA and Hamas-controlled bodies is discussed in a series of Arabic-language documents from 2018–2022, originating with the Gaza Interior Security Mechanism (ISM), a unit within the Hamas Ministry of Interior and National Security (MoINS). The documents were removed from Gaza and then declassified by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). These materials provide insight into the operational interface between humanitarian actors and Hamas-controlled institutions, in particular indicating systematic coordination with OCHA-linked programming, including approval processes by Hamas bodies, the provision of beneficiary lists through the MoSD, and mechanisms enabling influence over project implementation.

Reliance on MoSD-Sourced Beneficiary Data

A July 13, 2021 document concerning a project request by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), implemented in partnership with Mercy Corps and funded by OCHA, indicates reliance on Hamas-controlled data sources. The document states that “the targeted sector’s data were acquired from the Ministry of Social Development,” underscoring the use of MoSD-sourced beneficiary information in identifying target populations.¹

Similarly, a September 15, 2021 document relating to a project implemented by the Life and Hope Association, funded by OCHA in cooperation with Mercy Corps, to rehabilitate 175 farmers whose agricultural lands were damaged during hostilities in Gaza and northern Gaza, reflects MoSD involvement in beneficiary selection.² The document notes that the Life and Hope Association received “700 names from the Ministry of Social Development” for consideration in the selection process. It also states that “the project is with the coordination of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Social Development, where names of the beneficiaries are nominated by them.”

The document includes a list of project team members, noting that one individual was described as having “a great tie with members of Hamas,” raising concerns regarding the presence of politically affiliated actors within project implementation structures.

Hamas Intervention in Survey Design and Data Collection

A July 29, 2020 document provides evidence of Hamas involvement in shaping data collection tools used in OCHA-funded programming.³ The document concerns a humanitarian survey conducted by the Al-Fukhary Rural Development Association in partnership with Mercy Corps, as part of a project funded by OCHA. The project targeted 317 vulnerable households in Gaza to provide cash assistance and livelihood support.

The document reveals that Hamas authorities reviewed the survey prior to implementation and instructed the removal of multiple questions. In particular, MoINS demanded “to remove the item concerning injuries from the return marches completely from all questionnaires,” stating that “there is no relation between providing aid and the question for them about the return [march] injured.”

The terror group was particularly concerned with limiting information on casualties associated with the 2018 “Great Return Marches,” a series of border riots orchestrated by Hamas in preparation for October 7th-style attacks on Israeli communities.

Hamas also commanded the removal of questions relating to family members’ willingness to engage in “dangerous behavior that could result in physical or psychological harm, imprisonment, or social stigma,” citing concerns that “the objective is identifying the workers in the resistance.”

In addition, the project required approvals through MoSD, reinforcing the role of Hamas-controlled institutions in overseeing beneficiary selection and data collection processes.

Institutional Embedding within Implementing Structures

In addition to its role in providing beneficiary data, MoSD is embedded within the operational and organizational structures of OCHA-funded implementing partners, indicating a broader institutional role beyond data provision.

A June 13, 2021 document concerns the OCHA-funded Youth Empowerment Center–Palestine (YEC),⁴ implemented in partnership with Oxfam, aimed at providing adequate living spaces for vulnerable households and persons with disabilities in Gaza City and the northern districts.⁵ The ten-month project, launched in December 2020, was to benefit 215 households.

The document states that the “association’s field of operations falls under the [jurisdiction of] the Ministry of Social Development,” indicating formal alignment of the project’s operational scope with a Hamas-controlled ministry.

The document notes that beneficiary lists were “received from the Ministry of Social Development.” In this case, the ministry’s role extended beyond beneficiary provision and formed part of the project’s institutional operating framework.

The governance structure of the implementing organization also reflects this embeddedness. The document lists seven board members of YEC, three of whom are identified as “Hamas supporters,” indicating the presence of politically affiliated actors within the leadership of an organization directly implementing OCHA-funded programming.

Security-Service Oversight and Intelligence Involvement

A November 30, 2022 document relates to a $300,000 project implemented by Palestinian Environmental Friends (PEF) and funded by OCHA.⁶ The document references the composition of project teams, noting that some members were affiliated with Hamas.

The document highlights the involvement of security and intelligence bodies in project approval and oversight. It states that “It is important for field monitoring for these projects, insuring of safety of these projects and emphasizing the project’s sites do not overlap with the locations of resistance activities…With regard to the maps of excavations and field works locations, it is required to receive the assessment and approval of brothers in intelligence,” demonstrating that implementation decisions required prior approval from security services.

The document also includes instructions to remove or erase questions potentially relating to Hamas tunnel infrastructure from the questionnaire to be administered to project participants, raising concerns regarding the control of information within project documentation processes.

OCHA Funding to Organizations with Ties to Terrorism

OCHA channels significant funding to implementing NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza, primarily through the OCHA oPt Humanitarian Fund (oPt HF), a key mechanism for allocating humanitarian resources to local and international partner organizations. The Fund has provided financing to organizations with documented ties to designated terrorist groups, including entities formally designated as terrorist organizations.⁷

 1. In 2025, the oPt HF allocated $3.1 million to Al Awda Health and Community Association for health-related projects in Gaza. AWDA (formerly UHWC) is identified by Fatah as an official PFLP “affiliate” and by a 1993 USAID-engaged audit as the “the PFLP’s health organization.” Academic analysis has similarly described UHWC as a “PFLP-affiliated health committee,” noting the ideological alignment of many staff and physicians with the organization’s political framework. (For additional information, see NGO Monitor’s report “Union of Health Work Committees’ Ties to the PFLP Terror Group.”)

 2. In the same year, the oPt HF provided $1.5 million to the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC) for agricultural rehabilitation and humanitarian support. UAWC has been identified by Fatah as an official PFLP “affiliate” and by a USAID-engaged audit as the “agricultural arm” of the PFLP. On October 22, 2021, the Israeli Ministry of Defense declared UAWC a “terror organization” because it is part of “a network of organizations” that operates “on behalf of the ‘Popular Front’.” Two UAWC officials – Samer Arbid and Abdel Razeq Farraj – are standing trial for their alleged involvement in the August 2019 bombing that killed 17-year-old Israeli Rina Shnerb. Both individuals have been publicly identified by the PFLP as members of the organization. For more information on UAWC’s PFLP ties, read NGO Monitor’s report “Union of Agricultural Work Committees Ties to the PFLP Terror Group.”

UAWC has also participated in projects implemented through OCHA-funded international NGOs, including Première Urgence Internationale.

3. In 2025, Aisha Association for Woman and Child Protection received $1.7 million from the oPt HF for projects relating to emergency cash assistance and humanitarian response programming in Gaza. Members of Aisha’s board of directors, Taghreed Jomaa and Elias al-Jelda, have served as PFLP Central Committee members (see NGO Monitor’s report “EU NGO Funding for the West Bank and Gaza in 2022”). In October 2023, Jomaa publicly disseminated social media content denying Hamas atrocities committed on October 7th, including claims that visual documentation of victims was fabricated or manipulated.

 4. In 2025, the oPt HF also allocated approximately $1.3 million to Palestine Save the Children Foundation (PSCF) for humanitarian programming in Gaza. According to an August 21, 2019 declassified Hamas interrogation document concerning a PSCF employee, the individual “worked in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in 2007, and worked in the military wing for 5 months,” before later disengaging following the death of a relative who had served as his PIJ commander.⁸

The document records that the PSCF employee had prior involvement with PIJ-related activities and maintained contact with individuals linked to the organization. It further states that he “testified that he asked his brother [] who works in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to return and [again] work with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” indicating continued engagement with PIJ networks at the time. 

The interrogation summary also states that the individual had been exposed to Salafi-jihadist ideology and maintained contact with individuals described in the document as “people of the deviant ideology” (a term used by Hamas security services to refer to Salafist and ISIS-linked actors). It records that he “obtained publications of the Islamic State” and followed ISIS-related content online, including via dedicated propaganda channels. At the same time, the document notes that he was employed in a professional capacity at Palestine Save the Children and that he “currently ceased his relationship with people of the deviant ideology due to his work in a societal association (Palestine Save the Children), which he intends to keep [the job], and he is devoted to his work.”

 5. Additional OCHA-funded organizations with reported ties to the PFLP include Health Work Committees (HWC), Defense for Children International – Palestine (DCIP), and Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR). These organizations have received substantial humanitarian funding for health, protection, and cash-assistance programming despite documented affiliations of senior officials or board members with PFLP structures or activity. 

See Appendix 2 for further information regarding funding to PFLP-linked NGOs.

Lack of Transparency in OCHA Funding Frameworks

The ability to independently assess OCHA-oPt’s funding relationships with implementing NGOs, as well as its operational coordination with Hamas-controlled ministries, authorities, and other governing bodies in Gaza, is limited by significant transparency deficiencies within OCHA-managed reporting systems, particularly in light of the dramatic expansion of humanitarian assistance to Gaza following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks.

OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS) describes itself as a “voluntary reporting mechanism,” under which “all public and private organizations making contributions towards humanitarian outcomes in a given country are welcome to report to FTS.” As reporting is voluntary, the system does not provide a comprehensive accounting of humanitarian aid flows into Gaza, contributing to significant gaps in transparency and oversight.

The lack of transparency extends to the identity of implementing organizations. In a number of cases, recipients are listed only as “International NGOs (Confidential)” or “National NGOs (Confidential),” obscuring the identity of grantees receiving humanitarian funding and limiting public scrutiny regarding potential affiliations or conflicts of interest.

In addition, numerous grants reported through OCHA frameworks identify the destination only as the “State of Palestine,” without distinguishing between Gaza or the West Bank. According to NGO Monitor research, approximately $100 million annually in reported funding lacks sufficient geographic specificity to determine the final area of implementation.

Moreover, since 2020, and especially following the sharp increase in humanitarian funding after October 7, 2023, OCHA’s funding databases have become significantly less transparent than in previous years, making it increasingly difficult to identify implementing NGO partners in Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel. In many instances, implementing partners are no longer publicly listed in project documentation or funding records.

These deficiencies substantially limit independent oversight and impede efforts to assess whether humanitarian funds are reaching the intended civilian beneficiaries or are being directed through organizations and frameworks linked to Hamas-controlled institutions or terror-affiliated actors.

Integration of Terror-Linked Organizations into OCHA-Led Humanitarian Governance Structures

Beyond funding relationships, NGOs linked to designated terrorist groups are embedded within OCHA-oPt’s own governance and coordination mechanisms.

OCHA organizes humanitarian operations through thematic “clusters,” including Protection, Education, Shelter, Health and Nutrition, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), and the Food Security Sector (FSS). Within these frameworks, NGOs serve as implementing partners alongside UN agencies and, in some cases, hold leadership or coordination roles within the clusters themselves. 

Several NGOs participating in these structures have documented ties to the PFLP. OCHA-oPt regularly partners with such actors, facilitates funding to them through humanitarian mechanisms, and tasks them with implementation responsibilities across cluster activities. 

In practice, the cluster system also functions as a platform for political advocacy, public reporting, and international lobbying related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (For more information, read NGO Monitor’s report “Political Advocacy NGO Involvement in UN Humanitarian Aid Clusters.”)

This cluster system operates under the broader coordination framework of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), which provides “strategic and operational decision-making and oversight” and is responsible for planning, prioritization, and resource allocation across humanitarian clusters. 

Within this framework, the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) and other umbrella bodies play a significant role in advisory and coordination processes.

OCHA-oPt Structure

PNGO is an umbrella organization comprising more than 140 Palestinian NGOs, many of which engage in BDS (boycotts, divestment, and sanctions) advocacy and, in some cases, maintain documented links to the PFLP. PNGO has also publicly opposed donor-imposed counterterrorism clauses restricting engagement with designated terrorist entities. 

Several PNGO member organizations and affiliated individuals have been linked to the PFLP through arrests, prosecutions, or documented organizational affiliation, including individuals implicated in the 2019 bombing that killed Israeli teenager Rina Shnerb.

Organizations designated by Israel as part of PFLP-linked networks, including the Bisan Center for Research and Development, have also participated in OCHA advisory and coordination structures, including OCHA oPt Humanitarian Fund governance mechanisms.

OCHA oPt Humanitarian Fund Advisory Board

Representatives of PFLP-linked organizations also hold operational roles within OCHA cluster mechanisms. For example, UAWC Project Coordinator Moayad Bsharat serves as regional coordinator in Qalqilya and Salfit within the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Cluster operating under the OCHA-oPt framework. According to the cluster description, the position includes responsibilities to “coordinate with communities and local authorities to develop advocacy initiatives, facilitate donor visits and need assessments.”

WASH Cluster Partner’s Profile – July 2022

OCHA assessment and planning frameworks also incorporate data provided by Hamas-controlled ministries, including the MoSD, within humanitarian needs assessments and operational planning processes.

Taken together, these arrangements indicate that organizations linked to Hamas and the PFLP are not merely recipients of humanitarian funding, but are also integrated into formal coordination, advisory, and governance structures shaping humanitarian priorities and implementation in Gaza and the West Bank.

Political Use of Humanitarian Reporting and Data Framing

OCHA-oPt also plays a significant role in shaping international narratives through its reporting and public communications.

OCHA-oPt frequently republishes or relies on claims originating from political advocacy NGOs, including organizations with ties to designated terrorist groups, as well as Palestinian officials and Hamas-controlled bodies. These allegations are then widely cited by international media, governments, and UN bodies, effectively laundering political advocacy narratives through UN humanitarian reporting frameworks.

OCHA reporting also regularly presents casualty data without distinguishing between civilians and combatants. This framing obscures the context of violence, inflates civilian casualty numbers, and creates false equivalence between deliberate attacks targeting civilians and Israeli counterterrorism or military operations.

In addition, OCHA aid-tracking updates regarding humanitarian assistance entering Gaza often rely on partial datasets that exclude significant categories of aid. For example, some include disclaimers indicating that the figures reflect only aid coordinated through UNRWA channels, erasing the sizable volume of  humanitarian assistance entering Gaza through other mechanisms. These practices contribute to inaccurate data, public confusion, and distorted international perceptions regarding humanitarian conditions in Gaza.

Conclusion

The evidence presented in this report raises serious concerns regarding OCHA-oPt’s adherence to core humanitarian principles, particularly neutrality, independence, accountability, and due diligence. Rather than maintaining clear institutional separation from Hamas-controlled authorities and terror-linked actors, OCHA appears to have enabled their integration into humanitarian coordination, beneficiary-selection mechanisms, operational planning, and funding structures.

The findings point to significant deficiencies in partner vetting, oversight, transparency, and risk-management procedures. OCHA-funded and OCHA-coordinated projects repeatedly relied on Hamas-controlled ministries for beneficiary identification, operational approvals, and data collection, while organizations with documented ties to the PFLP continued to receive funding and participate in OCHA-oPt’s own governance.

The findings from declassified Hamas documents are particularly troubling because they indicate that Hamas authorities were not merely aware of humanitarian programming, but were actively involved in shaping and supervising aspects of implementation. The documents reveal that Hamas exercised influence over surveys, beneficiary lists, project approvals, and field operations, while also seeking to limit the collection of sensitive information related to its military and operational activities.

These patterns underscore the urgent need for comprehensive independent review of OCHA-oPt’s partner-vetting standards, funding mechanisms, oversight procedures, and coordination frameworks. Donor governments and UN bodies should reassess existing safeguards and implement substantially stronger transparency, compliance, and counterterrorism due diligence measures to ensure that humanitarian assistance is not vulnerable to manipulation, politicization, or exploitation by Hamas-controlled institutions and organizations linked to designated terrorist groups.

Appendix 1: Ghazi Hamad

In April 2019, Hamas appointed politburo member, Ghazi Hamad, to lead the Ministry of Social Development.

• In November 2024, the Treasury Department designated Hamad, labeling him a “senior Hamas official[].” The announcement added, “Hamad previously served as a Hamas senior official overseeing border crossings at Gaza. While these border crossings were one of the primary ways Hamas smuggled weapons into Gaza, these crossings were also used to smuggle the construction equipment and materials Hamas needed to build an extensive tunnel network they intentionally interspersed among Palestinian civilians.”
• In an October 24, 2023 interview on Lebanese television, Hamad hailed the October 7th massacre:
  • “Israel is a state that has no place on our land. We must eliminate this state because it is truly a security, military and political catastrophe for the Arab and Islamic nation. It must end.”
  • When asked if he seeks “the annihilation of Israel,” Hamad responded, “Of course.”
  • “We must teach Israel a lesson, and we will do it twice and three times. The Al-Aqsa Flood [Hamas’ name for the October 7th massacre] is just the first time, and there will be a second, a third, a fourth…On October 7th, October 10th, October one-millionth, everything we do is justified.”

Ghazi Hamad, pictured with the Hamas flag, in an October 31, 2023 interview with the Associated Press

Appendix 2: Funding to PFLP-Linked NGOs via OCHA oPt Humanitarian Fund

Data taken from UN OCHA’s “Allocations, projects and contribution dashboards” database