Background

On March 17, 2026, Dutch Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation Sjoerd Sjoerdsma responded to two sets of parliamentary questions, submitted by MP Rajkowski (VVD) and MPs Markuszower and Lammers (Markuszower Group), respectively. Both sets of questions related to the findings of NGO Monitor’s reports, “Puppet Regime: Hamas’ Coercive Grip on Aid and NGO Operations in Gaza” and “Dutch Support for NGO Programs in Hamas-Controlled Gaza.” The first demonstrates the terrorist group’s systematic control of foreign NGOs operating in Gaza, while the latter focuses on the implications for the Netherlands.

In both responses, Minister Sjoerdsma claimed that “There is no information available that supports the allegations of NGO Monitor” (emphasis added). This conclusion – which is inconsistent with publicly available documentation, as evidenced in detail below – forms the basis upon which “the Cabinet [expresses its] confidence in the neutrality and independence of the work of partner organizations with which the Netherlands works” and rejects the need to strengthen vetting mechanisms.

Ten Years of Available Information

The central finding of NGO Monitor’s “Puppet Regime” report is that NGOs operating in Gaza – including those funded by the Netherlands – have long functioned under a system of Hamas control, involving interference in operations, pressure on staff, and influence over aid distribution.

NGO Monitor’s findings are confirmed from an unlikely source: the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR), in its Annual Report from 2016 – the same year that PCHR was a grantee of a project funded by the Dutch government. PCHR states:

  • “The most prominent attack against international organizations [that year] was the [Hamas-run] Ministry of Interior’s attempt to force the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) to reveal private information of the Council regarding the beneficiaries of its services, which would affect the privacy of the beneficiaries. The request was refused by the NRC, which led the Ministry of Interior to closing the Council for a few days. Moreover, international organizations were subjected to harassments [sic] by the Ministry of Interior, even though they usually resort to friendly solutions by offering concessions regarding their work.” (emphases added)
  • “The statements of officials in the Associations’ Department reveal their suspicion when dealing with associations, how they impose audit procedures and hint at corruption particularly with regards to those who object [to] this arbitrary monitoring. Among the imposed restrictions was a statement of the Ministry of Interior to ban any activity related to gathering information through surveys or conducting studies unless they were approved by the abovementioned Ministry. Moreover, the Ministry of Interior is constantly auditing the associations’ files without legal justification. In March, according to the Ministry’s website, they audited 26 association (sic) and subjected 7 others to search. These numbers reflect the security mentality of the Ministry of Interior when dealing with associations.” (emphases added)

Beyond the involvement of aid NGOs, the many links between UNRWA and clearly identified terror operatives in Hamas have been clearly documented, for example, by UN Watch.    Even the highly problematic Colonna Report – to which Minister Sjoerdsma referred in his response to MPs Markuszower and Lammers as having “show[n] that UNRWA has the necessary mechanisms, procedures, and policies in place to ensure compliance with the principle of neutrality” – acknowledges that, prior to the Hamas-orchestrated October 7th massacre, “in Gaza and its field offices, the volatile context and security challenges may prevent reporting of allegations and investigating at the local level… Field office investigators in Gaza risk their personal security.”

This is a sanitized acknowledgement of pervasive coercion, intimidation, and terror in Gaza, whereby reporting malfeasance and violations of ethics and standards invite harassment and retribution.

Furthermore, it is a matter of publicly recorded fact that Hamas has embedded senior officials within key ministries, including the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) which plays a central role in interacting with the international aid industry. Most significantly, in April 2019, Hamas appointed a politburo member, Ghazi Hamad (designated by the US Department of Treasury in 2024) to lead MoSD. In the aftermath of the Oct 7th massacre, Hamad often spoke about “eliminating” Israel and the desire to perpetrate similar attacks.

A UN description of a 2022 project in Gaza implemented by Mercy Corps – an NGO that receives repeated Dutch funding – highlights reliance on MoSD for selection of recipients of cash assistance, allowing Hamas to control this process:

  • “Through unconditional cash assistance, this project will identify and select the most vulnerable HHs [households] … from the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) unserved waiting lists of Social Safety Net (SSN).” (emphases added)
  • “Mercy Corps and partners will … identify, assess and verify selected vulnerable HHs [households] to receive cash assistance, monitor activities, and ensure full coordination and engagement with the MoSD, Ministry of Agriculture, the community and all other relevant stakeholders.” (emphasis added)
  • “Mercy Corps will be the focal point of coordination with MoSD.” (emphasis added)

A Series of Unheeded Warnings

This is not the first time that the Dutch government tried to ignore inconvenient but independently verifiable evidence of fundamental problems with its NGO aid grantees.

NGO Monitor raised concerns regarding the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC) and its links to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) – an EU-designated terrorist organization – at a time when UAWC was a significant recipient of Dutch funding.

The Dutch government initially denied the allegations.

Then, on July 20, 2020, the Dutch government confirmed NGO Monitor’s findings and announced that it was suspending funding to UAWC over links to the PFLP. During a parliamentary debate, then Foreign Minister Stef Blok and Development Minister Sigrid Kaag acknowledged that an internal government audit concluded that Dutch funds were used to pay the salaries of two UAWC employees who were also members of the PFLP terror organization and who were arrested for the murder of a 17-year-old Israeli girl, Rina Shnerb, in August 2019.

In January 2022, the Dutch Foreign Minister announced that the Netherlands would cease all funding to UAWC. According to the Minister, the investigation determined that UAWC had 34 employees with ties to the PFLP in 2007-2020, 12 holding leadership positions in the terrorist group concurrent to their employment at UAWC. In reporting to parliament, Ministers de Brujin and Knapen added that “the large number of board members of UAWC with a dual mandate is particularly worrying.”

Despite these findings, in 2022-2025, Oxfam Novib – a member of the Dutch government-funded Dutch Relief Alliance (DRA) – provided €358,210 to UAWC in the context of a €3.35 million EU-funded project titled “Gaza Economic Resilience.”

In his answers to MP Rajkowski’s parliamentary questions, Minister Sjoerdsma stated that the Cabinet “[supports] various professional aid organizations, including … the Dutch Relief Alliance … with unearmarked, flexibly deployable contributions.” When MP Rajkowski asked whether Minister Sjoerdsma is “prepared, partly in response to the NGO Monitor report, to ensure stricter and independent screening of partners within the DRA to prevent aid [diversion,]” he simply replied, “No.”

Conclusion

The Dutch government’s claim that “no information is available” to substantiate concerns about NGOs operating in Gaza is contradicted by more than a decade of publicly documented evidence. Reports from NGO Monitor, as well as claims in Palestinian sources, UN-commissioned assessments, and even prior Dutch government investigations consistently show patterns of manipulation, coercion, and infiltration in the Palestinian NGO sector. 

The case of UAWC underscores the consequences of inadequate oversight. Despite initial denials, the government later confirmed that Dutch-funded aid had paid the salaries of PFLP terrorists, including the murderers of Rina Shnerb. Even after these findings, indirect funding through frameworks like the DRA, which receives open-ended funding from the Dutch government, demonstrates that lessons from past failures have not been fully operationalized.

By dismissing well-documented evidence and refusing to strengthen independent vetting and monitoring mechanisms, the Netherlands is evading accountability. This not only undermines the credibility and neutrality of its humanitarian assistance but also erodes public trust. Without a fundamental shift toward confronting and addressing these documented abuses, unsupported claims that “due diligence processes … are in order” amount to empty rhetoric.