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Excuse the cliché — but it appears that the flotilla is dead in the water. A few boats and “activists” made it to Athens, but two recent attempts to sail toward Gaza were stopped by the Greek Coast Guard. The captain of the American ship has been charged with endangering passengers’ lives and leaving port without permission, and the ship was impounded far from Gaza.

Signs that the second Gaza flotilla would end in farce – one year after last year’s fatal encounter – appeared many weeks earlier. IHH, the Turkish “humanitarian organization” that led the 2010 flotilla and has ties to radical Islamic groups like Hamas, announced that it would not participate in the reenactment. They cited unfinished repairs to the infamous ship the Mavi Marmara, but the Turkish government reportedly pulled the plug, as a positive gesture towards Israel.

Beyond the specific case, this example provides a model that can be used more widely in defeating political warfare that is based on exploiting human rights rhetoric — a policy developed at the NGO Forum of the Durban Conference on Racism in September 2001. Since Durban, the NGO network has mounted a sustained global campaign to isolate and delegitimize Israel through boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) campaigns, lawsuits targeting Israeli politicians, and stunts like the flotilla.

A flood of NGO reports and UN “investigations” followed Durban, embodying and extending the political warfare to demonize Israel. The 2009 Goldstone Report on the Gaza war was particularly damaging, with numerous allegations of deliberate attacks on civilians, largely quoting from the NGO publications. However, a few months ago, Judge Goldstone repudiated his own report, admitting that many of the NGO claims were false or unfounded.

The Durban strategy was also behind the first flotilla incident in May 2010 and subsequent “reports” on the provocation. The IHH-led effort to break the Gaza blockade in support of Hamas, and the violent confrontation with Israel, gained a great deal of media attention which reinforced the dominant images of Palestinian victimization and Israeli “war crimes”.

With Israel’s need to avoid a reprisal of last year’s incident, several factors contributed to exposing and eventually preventing this year’s flotilla. Together, they create a sort of lesson plan for countering future Durban Strategy tactics

First, the “humanitarian activists” and NGOs behind the 2010 and 2011 flotilla were widely discredited, and widespread doubt has been expressed about their real motives. Allegations that participants were humanitarian activists were laid bare: last year’s ship contained little aid; instead, expired medications, broken medical equipment, camouflage material (intended for Hamas uniforms), and several caches of weapons were found. The link between Hamas and flotilla organizers was too great to ignore: IHH is a member of the Union of Good, an umbrella group of 50+ Islamic organizations established as a funding conduit by the Hamas leadership.

Therefore, from the beginning, the “activists” involved in the 2011 attempted reenactment were met with unexpected hostility. U.S. Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL), a member of the Progressive Congressional Caucus, distanced herself from The Progressive Democrats of America who support the flotilla. Schakowsky called the flotilla "ridiculous", and other world leaders echoed her sentiments, while noting that Israeli policies on Gaza had eased.

The Free Gaza movement was also forced to acknowledge that the flotilla was a political rather than humanitarian venture. The American boat was set to sail with no humanitarian aid on board. And while flotilla organizers repeatedly denied their collaboration with Hamas, Dutch journalists exposed the truth. Bart Olmer reported in the Telegraaf (Netherlands) that Dutch Hamas chief Amin Abou Rashed attended the crew’s training sessions in Greece. Journalists also revealed that Abou Rashed was the master-mind behind the fleet and took care of the "lion’s share of the financing." The presence of Hamas – along with flotilla organizers’ attempts to censor journalists – led to a decision by all Dutch journalists to abandon the ships.

In addition, legal challenges and questions helped to thwart the flotilla. The Israel Law Center (Shurat HaDin) filed complaints in various jurisdictions, targeting different elements of the flotilla process. The group sent letters to maritime insurance companies and filed a complaint against global satellite company Inmarsat regarding their role in providing communication services. Shurat HaDin also contacted Greek officials and encouraged them to detain ships that were preparing to violate international law.

Finally, this time, the Israeli government implemented a well-strategized diplomatic campaign. Warming relations with Turkey may have led the Edrogan government to keep IHH from sailing. And the Greek authorities, who understood the potential for violence and violation of international laws, detained the boats.

The multi-layered efforts that helped Israel avert a provocation in the Mediterranean and another global wave of condemnation have important lessons for future rounds of the Durban strategy. The exposure and dissemination of verifiable information showing ties to terrorism was central, as were the creative efforts to use legal frameworks to Israel’s advantage, for a change. Professional journalists who were reporting from the ships demonstrated that they would not automatically and simplistically repeat the activists’ narrative.

Judge Goldstone’s belated retraction of his report was a major reversal in the Durban strategy, and the flotilla farce is another move in the same direction. Perhaps these will later be seen as the high water mark in the political war to demonize Israel.

Paula Kweskin is a legal researcher for REPORT Inc., an American non-profit organization.