On August 19, 2024, Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a statement (“Yemen: Israeli Port Attack Possible War Crime” accusing Israel of “an apparently unlawful indiscriminate or disproportionate attack on civilians” for airstrikes on the Yemini port of  Hodeida (also written Hudaydah or Hodeidah) on July 20. Israel’s strikes followed months of drone and missile attacks on Israeli population centers and other civilian targets by the Houthis, the internationally designated terror group that controls parts of Yemen. The night before, a Houthi drone killed an Israeli civilian in Tel Aviv.

Repeating its standard formula, as practiced for more than 20 years, HRW presents its conclusions as if they are the result of a detailed investigation. Yet, already on July 22, HRW Yemen Researcher Niku Jafarnia posted on X/Twitter, “The Houthis’ actions in no way justify this response from Israel, which has caused immense civilian harm.” (HRW and its key officials in the region did not contemporaneously comment on the Houthi drone attack.) In other words, HRW’s “investigation” reached its predetermined findings.

Moreover, factual claims made by HRW in this statement contradict previous HRW claims, notably a statement from December 2023. (Perhaps unsurprisingly, the December statement related to Houthi attacks against non-Israeli targets, and so the ideological factor was less prevalent.)

Unreliable sources

In its attempt to dismiss Israeli claims that the strikes targeted “dual-use infrastructure used for terrorist activities,” HRW cites interviews with “a Houthi official in Yemen’s oil industry” and UN employees.

According to the Houthi official, “the oil tanks at the port are not owned by the Houthis but ‘by Yemeni businessmen who import the oil and resell it to fuel stations and other institutions.’” Obviously, a representative from the terror organization that is exploiting the port and systematically diverting fuel and humanitarian goods has zero credibility.

Similarly, claims from the UN officials – who stated that there was no evidence of “a Houthi military presence in the port” or weapons on vessels entering it – have limited or no credibility. As admitted by HRW, “Houthi authorities provide prior approval for UN access and accompany UN officials on inspections” in a process lacking integrity. Nevertheless, HRW embraces their tainted and carefully curated observations.

Highlighting the absence of substantial evidence, HRW resorts to the absurd claim that the absence of official comment is proof that “the Israeli attack [was] unlawfully indiscriminate”: “The Israeli government has not provided information to substantiate [its] claims… that weapons or military supplies were being stored at or delivered to the port, or that the oil and electricity … were being diverted to the Houthi military.” Clearly, Israel is under no obligation to reveal operational intelligence to HRW, and the NGO’s inventions do not “make the Israeli attack unlawfully indiscriminate.” In fact, as discussed below, there is more than sufficient information in the public domain attesting to the Houthi exploitation of the Hodeida port for aggression, which HRW ignores based on ideological frames.

Ignoring its own inconvenient previous claims

HRW’s and the UN’s claim that the Hodeida port was not used for military purposes is demonstrably false and is contradicted by previous statements from HRW itself. In December 2023, HRW wrote (“Yemen: Houthis Attack Civilian Ships”), “Footage that the Houthis posted online show Houthi forces boarding the ship, moving around, and pointing guns at the crew. The Houthis then steered the ship, along with the crew, to al-Salif Port in Hodeidah, which is under their control…”

Similarly, an AP report from January 2024 details such activities. This was also reported by Al Jazeera in June 2024, regarding Houthi “small watercraft” that attacked a Greek ship “near the Red Sea port of Hodeidah.”

Disproportionality slogans

As in many other statements and reports, HRW twists international law in pursuit of its 25-year policy of automatically condemning Israel.

First, as noted, HRW alleges that Israel did not attack a military target. Then, because it does not possess the requisite knowledge and expertise to make such a determination, HRW alleges that “even if the attack were against valid military objectives, the harm to the civilian population likely made the attack disproportionate.”

HRW does not provide meaningful evidence for this claim. Rather, it asserts that the reported 6 deaths and 80 injured, as well as the apparent “excessive immediate and longer-term harm for large swaths of the Yemeni population who rely on the Hodeidah port for survival.” (HRW seems to have forgotten another aspect of its December 2023 statement, namely the Houthis’ responsibility for the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Yemen.)

Moreover, HRW does not even attempt to calculate the anticipated strategic military advantages to Israel that would be achieved by a severe blow to Houthi infrastructure in Yemen. Of particular note, and unconsidered by HRW, is the strategic need for deterrence after the unprecedented and deadly July 19 drone attack on Tel Aviv.